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RESUM/RESUMEN/ABSTRACT: This dissertation presents what are the less disruptive 
strategies for any given Euro Area Member State willing to withdraw from the Euro and the 
Eurosystem depending on its initial macroeconomic circumstances and what would be the 
expected results and the consequences of such process. 
 
RESUM EN CATALÀ: Aquesta dissertació presenta quines són les estratègies menys disruptives 
per a un Estat Membre qualsevol de la Zona Euro disposat a abandonar l'Euro i l'Eurosistema 
depenent de les seves circumstancies macroeconòmiques inicials i quins serien els resultats 
esperats i les conseqüències de tal procés. 
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GLOSSARY AND FORMULATIONS 
 
CJEU: Court of Justice of the European Union. 
CPI: Consumer Prices Index 
EMU: Economic and Monetary Union. 
ECB: European Central Bank 
HCPI: Harmonised Consumer Prices Index 
MS: Member State. 
NNC: New National Currency. 
NCB: National Central Bank. 
PPI: Producer Prices Index 
PPP: Power Purchasing Parity 
RER: Real Exchange Rate 
REER: Real Effective Exchange Rate 
RCULC: Rate of Change of Unit Labour Costs 
RCWS: Rate of Change of the Wage Share 
TEU: Treaty on European Union. 
TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
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Formulations 
Yr: Real output 
Lf: Labour force 
Productivity:   yr= Yr/Lf 
w: Monetary wages 
p: Price level 
Wage Share: 
 
 
 
Adjusted Wage Share: [(UWCD : NWTD) : (UVGD : NETD)] × 100 
UWCD = Compensation of employees; total economy.  
NWTD = Employees, persons; all domestic industries. 
UVGD = Gross domestic product at current market prices. 
NETD = Employment, persons; all domestic industries. 
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2) INTRODUCTION 
 
The financial crisis which broke out in the late 2008 and its ensuing malaise have generated many 
casualties: the bursting of speculative bubbles in sectors like real estate, commodities in 
developing; the worsening of wages, of employment and of the labour conditions of workers in 
advanced economies and even -although to a much more moderate degree- the confidence on the 
hegemonic neoclassical economic framework and some neoliberal policies of the previous 
decades. During this systemic shift from benignity to dismay and lastly to uneasiness few other 
countries have matched the underperformance of the Eurozone as a whole, which has virtually 
wasted a full cycle of global growth. 
 
The unprecedented economic and political challenges for the relatively very young European 
Union -and especially the Euro area- have turned into threats to its own integrity. Notably, through 
rising political parties in many Member States in favour of departing from the European Union 
and/or the Eurozone. 
 
The flaws or rather the conscious limitations of the European Union project as it was designed -
and prominently featuring those of the Economic and Monetary Union- have been profusely 
analysed from an economic standpoint. Much has been written about the history of the adoption 
of the Euro as the EU's currency and the imbalances that the asymmetric design of the EMU 
sparked. Even before, with the European Monetary System from 1986 onwards. 
 
However, from an economic standpoint there has been remarkably few in-depth proposals about 
how a hypothetical Member State of the Euro Area could -through a systematic framework- exit 
the Eurozone. 
 
Given the possibility that a member of the Eurozone could deem as necessary in the future to 
abandon the Euro in favour of a New National Currency (NNC) in order to achieve 
macroeconomic relief and/or alternative sets of economic policies the subject is of utmost 
relevancy and it should -regardless of political inclinations towards Euroscepticism or Europhilia- 
be treated with a sober attitude. 
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For this dissertation I review legal and economic papers, reports and articles of different 
academics relevant for such hypothetical departure. Upon this basis, in some instances I add -and 
in some others I modify- some relevant aspects that I as an economist think would help making 
an exit less disruptive. Thus, gathering from other authors, I delineate two main original 
withdrawing strategies that should serve to the government of any Member State of the Eurozone 
in carrying out such policy with the most expediency and efficiency possible. 
 
The strategies exposed represent the general paths that governments of different Member States 
facing different circumstances should follow when introducing a New National Currency (NNC) 
in absence of an arranged multilateral break-up plan for the Euro area or other kinds of break-up 
arrangements which would comprise more than one State at the time.  
 
Furthermore, the work lays down what should be the general policies and legislative changes the 
country in question ought to implement for a time period up to a year or two after the departure 
to fully stabilize the new situation. 
 
A work such as this is multifaceted and requires acumen not only on Economics but also on Law 
and History, being as a result much more comprehensive and relevant for its application than a 
compartmented dissertation in any of these fields.  
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3) MAIN LEGAL ASPECTS TO TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION 
 
The unilateral or quasi-unilateral abandonment of the Eurosystem and of the Euro as the currency 
of legal tender is a project of systemic macroeconomic importance. It requires first of all an 
assessment of what would be the preferred way of departure according to the preset legal 
framework. 
 
The main references for this section have been the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) the Treaty of the European Union and a 2009 legal working paper of the European 
Central Bank (ECB) on the withdrawal and expulsion from the EU and the EMU (Athanassiou, 
P., 2009). 
 
To begin with -and as the ECB’s Working Paper points out- there is a legal vacuum to undertake 
the abandonment of the single currency. There is no procedure to forfeit the Euro contemplated 
either in the primary or in the secondary law of the European Union. 
 
The abandonment of not only the Euro, but of the EMU as a whole is only indirectly related to 
Article 50 TEU which establishes a procedure to abandon the EU as a whole. Interestingly, a 
country leaving the EU could still use the Euro as legal tender within the country, like other 
countries such as Montenegro, Kosovo, Andorra, etc. but not forming part of the decisions of the 
Eurosystem and not being lawfully able to issue Euros. 
 
Secondly, the legal basis which is usually invoked establishing the irrevocability of the Euro is 
Article 140(3) TFEU: “3. If it is decided, in accordance with the procedure set out in paragraph 
2, to abrogate a derogation, the Council shall, acting with the unanimity of the Member States 
whose currency is the euro and the Member State concerned, on a proposal from the Commission 
and after consulting the European Central Bank, irrevocably fix the rate at which the euro shall 
be substituted for the currency of the Member State concerned, and take the other measures 
necessary for the introduction of the euro as the single currency in the Member State concerned.” 
 
It is noteworthy to appreciate that the only article which refers to irrevocability refers to the 
irrevocability of the fixed exchange rate at which the State's currency shall be substituted by the 
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Euro at the end of the nominal convergence process. It does not establish at all that a country once 
using the Euro cannot abandon it in favour of another currency; it does not speak of the 
irrevocability of the Euro as such. 
Thirdly -and as a natural consequence of the absence of a legal basis about the irreversibility of 
the Euro- there is no contemplated legal punishment in case of a unilateral departure of the Euro. 
An absence extremely important for practical matters.  
 
Moreover – and as the ECB’s Working Paper points out (Athanassiou, P., 2009; pp. 33-36)- no 
Member State can be lawfully forced to abandon the European Union, whether in the case of the 
abandonment of the Euro or in almost any case. According to article 7 TEU a Member State can 
only -and in last instance- in cases of serious breaches of key principles such as human rights, 
democracy and the rule of law reflected in Article 2 TEU be suspended of its EU membership 
through a special legislative procedure of the European Union. Such procedure -which in any case 
would very hardly apply- requires to be started with a proposal by one third of the Member States, 
by the European Parliament or by the European Commission and to be approved by a majority of 
four fifths in the Council of the European Union. 
 
This greatly simplifies the factual possibilities to abandon the Euro unilaterally and renders the 
so-called irreversibility of the single currency as more of a political bluff than a factual reality, as 
no Member State has any factual need to abandon the EU in order to abandon the Euro as legal 
tender. 
 
The Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) could certainly be asked to examine whether 
the unilateral departure of a country from the Euro was lawful or not. In such a case it is arguable 
that a long period of time would pass until a ruling of the CJEU on the matter since there are the 
aforementioned legal vacuums, no contemplated punishment and no jurisprudence on the matter. 
 
The ECB’s Working Paper in its first chapter (Athanassiou, P., 2009; pp. 5-30). elaborates 
whether there is a lawful right of withdrawal from the EMU and on what would be the legal 
defence possible of a Member State in case of a unilateral withdrawal from the EMU in the pre-
Lisbon treaty and to the present circumstances from 2009 (which hold up until the present year 
2017). It concludes that in principle a Member State could not lawfully abandon the EMU in a 
12 
 
unilateral manner and there would be the need for a Treaty amendment to lawfully undertake such 
a measure and a consensual agreement between the Member States (Athanassiou, P., 2009; pp. 
30-31). 
 
Nonetheless, during the long deliberations of the CJEU, other macroeconomic side-effects and 
political decisions of other countries which I will discuss later on in this paper could render the 
ruling as almost irrelevant in the end. Moreover -and of crucial importance- in the worst case 
scenario for the leaving country, the CJEU arguably could only rule that the aforementioned 
country contravened the previous legal arrangement and would have to rejoin the Eurozone 
according to the nominal convergence criteria of the EMU stipulated for the introduction of the 
Euro. 
 
In such a case, the leaving country could find itself in a quite comfortable position, similar to that 
of Sweden, having previously signed it would adopt the Euro somewhere in the future but 
purposely infringing one of the convergence criteria so it is not required to further advance in the 
EMU’s criteria and effectively join the single currency. 
 
All in all and by all standards the unilateral abandonment of the Euro would be substantively 
undisturbed, even if the CJEU ruled against it according to convened EU legal order. 
 
To go even further we could make an additional consideration. Ammending the national 
Constitution to include the State as the sole undertaker of monetary sovereignty would very 
substantially reduce hopes of legal proceedings at the ECJ succeeding in requesting a return to 
the Eurosystem, but this constitutional change would not be a very likely scenario as the domestic 
opposition from other pro-Euro political forces would probably impede it in many countries.  
 
If the CJEU were to rule otherwise it would mean primacy of EU law over the national 
Constitution, something which has never happened and would imply from the part of the CJEU 
some of the biggest legal and political consequences in all the history of the European Integration 
process. 
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But as I have stated, this would be an unlikely scenario from the start. The most important 
acknowledgement is that there is no legal punishment contemplated for the unilateral exit of the 
Eurozone, no need to pact an abandonment of the EU membership and engage in any long political 
and legal discussion and very probably no need of rejoining it in the case of an unfavourable 
ruling of the CJEU. 
 
But then again, obviously in the case of an arranged departure or break-up other options can be 
found such as the use of Article 352, commonly known as the flexibility clause to allow some 
countries to leave the Euro or amendments of the treaties to clarify and make lawful the 
withdrawal proceeding.  
 
4) MAIN ECONOMIC ASPECTS TO CONSIDER FOR THE DEPARTURE 
 
4.1. THE NEW MODEL 
 
One of the fundamental aspects to assess in order to set out the departure strategy is to, first of 
all, determine what is the macroeconomic situation of the country and thenceforth anticipate what 
movements would take place in an exit scenario. 
 
Specifically, given that the intention is to put into circulation a new national currency and make 
redenominations accordingly we must asses what is the “Internal Balance and the “External 
Balance of the concerned country, and pay attention to important macroeconomic aspects such as 
the public debts, the balance of payments of the country, the banking system and some important 
indicators related to these. 
 
The macroeconomic considerations are essential not only to determine what should be the 
immediate arrangement of the abandonment of the Euro and the Eurosystem, but also to design a 
practical and successful transition, so as to reach normalisation in the best terms possible. 
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4.1.1. The theoretical framework 
 
Given that the aim of this dissertation is to devise general strategies for any given country I put 
forward a somewhat innovative systematic theoretical framework to assess the situation of 
departing countries and the policies they should follow during and after a transition period. It is, 
more specifically, a novation of the Swan diagram I reformulate according to Dr. Anwar Shaikh's 
Theory of Real Competition publicated in his 2016 book (Shaikh, A., 2016). 
 
The Theory of Real Competition is a general theory of capitalism which encompasses the 
microeconomics and macroeconomics of contemporary capitalism and explains how deriving 
from competition between companies -and the struggle between the labour force and the forces 
of capital within a country- countries compete with each other and how economic cycles unfold. 
 
For the economic purposes of this dissertation -the introduction of a new currency and the 
abandonment of a fix exchange rate in the most efficient manner possible- the key aspects of the 
Theory of Real Competition are the role of real and nominal exchange rates and the relation with 
real wages and wage shares within a country which decisively impact unit labour costs. 
 
In the chapter of International Competitition and the Theory of Exchange Rates (Shaikh, 
A., 2016; pp. 491-535) Dr. Shaikh concludes: “The sustainable real exchange rate is that 
which corresponds to the relative competitive position of a nation, as measured by its 
relative real unit labour costs. Second, [...] since the real exchange rate is pinned (through 
competition) by real unit labour costs and other factors, it is not free to adjust in such a 
way as to eliminate trade imbalances. Indeed, such imbalances will be persistent and will 
have to be covered by corresponding direct payments and/or capital inflows (foreign 
debt). It follows that currency devaluation will not, in itself, eliminate trade deficits. 
Rather, it would be successful only to the extent that it affects the real unit costs (via the 
real wage) and/or the nontradable-tradable price ratio of consumer goods (Shaikh 1995, 
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72). And that depends on the ability of workers and consumers to resist such effects1. 
Third, it tells us that the real exchange rate of a country is likely to depreciate when a 
country’s relative competitive position improves, other things being equal. Just as in the 
case of competition within a country, in which an industry with relatively falling costs will 
be able to lower prices, so too in international competition will a country’s export prices 
fall relatively, in common currency, when the corresponding relative real costs of 
production fall. […] A fourth implication is the real exchange rate between two countries 
that will be stationary only over an interval when their relative competitive positions and 
relative degrees of openness remain unchanged. In the absence of these special 
conditions, the real exchange rate will be non stationary, which implies that in general 
PPP will not hold. Fifth, because relative real unit labor costs can only change modestly 
in a given year, the same is likely to apply to the long-run trend of real exchange rates 
(shorter run factors are discussed later). `[…] Sixth, free trade is beneficial to a country 
only when it is strong enough to stand up to international competition. […] Finally of 
great practical importance to policy, the classical approach allows us to distinguish 
between two basic routes to increasing a country’s international competitiveness: (1) the 
high road that operates by continuously improving productivity; and (2) the low road that 
seeks to depress real wages and shift the burden of adjustment onto the backs of workers. 
The key point here is that rising productivity is compatible with rising real wages, even 
in the extreme case in which the latter rise faster than the former, so long as overall costs 
in the export industries are low enough to retain an absolute advantage.” 
 
4.1.2. The levers of action 
 
Any given government of a State under a fix exchange rate facing severe imbalances has two 
main levers of action in order to amend them bringing the country closer to its equilibrium. The 
first one is to abandon the fix exchange rate and alter the real exchange rate either through a 
nominal depreciation or an appreciation depending on the case.  
 
                                                          
1 Krugman argues that the virtue of currency devaluation is that it creates a de facto 
reduction in real wages by raising the prices of imported goods, at least for some time 
(Krugman, 2011). 
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The other one is to enact policies which reduce the aggregate wage share (internal labour force 
deflationary measures) or increase it (internal labour force boosting measures). Moving the 
internal balance function downwards or upwards correspondingly. 
 
The depreciating and/or internal deflationary policies are aimed at increasing the profitability of 
domestic goods, and services at least in the short and medium term against foreign substitutes. 
Both the tradable sector and the non-tradable sectors related to the services inflows and outflows 
of the Current Account balance experiment an increase in relative profitability. Although the 
theoretical framework is innovative the two levers of action I have mentioned are a very old and 
common set of alternatives in the history of fixed and pegged exchange rate regimes and they 
have been analysed by other schools of economic thought. 
 
Internal labour force boosting measures should be sought by countries with relative low Unit 
Labour Costs and negative output gaps. 
 
A nominal appreciation of the currency should be sought by countries whose excessive current 
account balances are generating bubbles in domestic resources and non-tradabable sectors within 
the country. 
 
Shaikh’s theoretical and empirical historical work provides a compelling very long term answer 
on what is the sustainable exchange rate of a currency against another country or a basket of other 
currencies, which is in itself a very old question in economics and argues that shorter term 
variations can be explained by movements on the real interest rates. In Appendix 11 of his book 
(Shaikh, A., 2016; pp. 876-880)explains how to calculate the long-run relationship between 
relative unit labour costs and the real exchange rate using orthodox indicators such as the Real 
Unit Labour Costs, the Consumers Price Index and the Producers Price Index. 
 
For its part, economist Roger Bootle in his Wolfson Economics Prize-winning paper Leaving the 
Euro: A Practical Guide (Bootle, R., 2012) confronts the same issue of sustainable exchange rates 
regarding a practical question for specifically the peripheral departing countries from the 
Eurozone: by how much should the peripheral countries’ exchange rates need to fall? 
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Bootle in Appendix 17 (Bootle, R., 2012; pp. 152-163) observes that different well-established 
indicators such as the GDP deflator, CPI, HCPI, and REER -upon which PPP theory is construed- 
and widely used to assess the overvaluation or undervaluation of a currency show misleading 
movements which not only make it hard to determine by how much should a currency adjust (also 
because it is a stochastic process influenced by national politics within different States) but also 
do not adequately serve to analyse which are the driving forces behind these movements. 
However, they are still useful to look at the trend and what direction do market forces push to. 
 
Therefore, Bootle -after examining these indicators and different labour costs indicators- comes 
to the conclusion that in 2012 the nominal exchange rates of the peripheral countries should 
depreciate by around 40% for Greece and Portugal and as perhaps as much as 30% for Italy and 
Spain (Bootle, R., 2012; pp. 162), which correspond the most with the differentials on the Unit 
Labour Costs that these countries have experienced against Germany since the introduction of the 
Euro. Bootle argues the nominal exchange rates might need to fall as much as 55% for Greece 
and Portugal and around 40% for Italy and Spain (Bootle, R., 2012; pp. 163). 
 
4.1.3. The New Macroeconomic Balance Diagram 
 
Given that Bootle offers reasonable estimates but lacking a sufficiently consistent framework and 
Shaikh offers a developed framework but with a degree of complexity somewhat beyond the 
needs for what I want to illustrate in this dissertation I put forward a middle ground solution by 
approximating the Real Exchange Rate of every Member State of the Eurozone with respect to 
the others to the Real Effective Exchange Rate of Unit Labour Cost for the Total Economy (ECB 
SDW, 2016). It is expressed as an index with the evolution of Relative Unit Labour Costs is 
expressed as an index with 1999Q1=100.  
 
This is the best statistical data series to be used and it is a readily available Harmonised 
Competitiveness Indicator calculated by the ECB which serves as a good proxy for Shaikh’s 
Relative Real Unit Labour Costs and which results reasonably coincide with Bootle’s assessment 
of which are the mismatches in exchange rates in the Eurozone. 
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In the diagram I construct, the Adjusted Wage Share (ω) is represented on the x axis and the Real 
Exchange Rate (RER) is represented on the y axis. The model and the diagram serve to observe 
movements in the short and medium run, in a convenient annual basis. 
 
The main underlying formulations of the model are: 
 
Real Exchange Rate ≈ Real ULC of a country’s total economy deflated against the hypothetical 
19 national currencies of the Eurozone (ECB SDW, 2017). 
 
Adjusted Wage Share: [(UWCD : NWTD) : (UVGD : NETD)] × 100  
 
The data is the Adjusted Wage Share as calculated by AMECO (AMECO, 2017). 
 
Assumptions: RER>0; 100>ω>0. 
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Figure 1. New Macroeconomic Balance Diagram 
 
Based on the relation between the Unemployment intensity and the yearly Rate of Change 
of the Wage Share (RCWS) described by Shaikh (Shaikh, A., 2016; pp. 646-672) I derive 
that the route a country has followed in the renewed Phillips' curve of Dr. Shaikh 
(regarding the rate of increase or decrease of the wage share from year to year) explains 
the total wage share a country has at a point in time and whether it causes the RER of the 
currency (or hypothetical currency in the case of the Members of the Euro area) to be out 
of equilibrium. 
The RER is fundamentally affected by what has been the Rate of Change of the Unit 
Labour Costs (RCULC) for which the Rate of Change of the Wage Share is usually the 
biggest component in a given country and it is affected by the RCULCs and RCWSs in 
the countries picked to calculate the RER. Divergences in the RWCS and the steepness 
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of the Shaikh’s Phillips’ Curve are the main explicative factor in assessing why the RER 
is out of equilibrium. 
 
4.1.4. The External balance equilibrium 
The External Balance function represents the equilibrium where the Current Account 
flows are neither excessive nor insufficient for the needs of the domestic economy. This 
doesn't necessary mean these are the points where the Current Account is 0, but whether 
a deficit or a surplus is below or above what would correspond to the structural 
development of the domestic economy. The furthest the distance from its equilibrium, the 
higher will be the market pressures on the domestic economy to adjust.  
If ceteris paribus a country has a lower wage share it will be able to be more competitive 
in its tradable goods and services. On the other hand, if it has a higher wage share it will 
be less competitive. This is the reason why it has a positive slope. 
External balance equilibrium function: 
RER= h*[ω(domestic)*100/ω(basket of currencies)] 
Where: 
ω= Wage share of the basket of currencies included. Different methods to determine the 
Wage Share  may apply, in this dissertation the AMECO data and methodology is applied 
(AMECO, 2017). 
h= elasticity of the effect of the domestic Rate of Change of the Unit Labour Costs 
(RULC) on the RER of the currency (which approximates to the Real HCI ULC in the 
cases considered). This refers to what is the effect of the movement of the wage share on 
relative Unit Labour Costs. 
Algebraically: 
h=RCULC (domestic)/RCULC (basket of foreign countries). 
The RCULC is closely tied to the RCWS given that Wages and Salaries are usually the 
most important component of Labour Costs (Eurostat, 2014), (OECD, 2017), and usually 
make the other related components increase or decrease accordingly. 
RCULC= RCWS+ RCOLCC (Rate of Change of Other Labour Cost Components). 
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In different statistical databases different components can be included or excluded in the 
calculations of the Unit Labour Costs, which will affect the overall Unit Labour Costs, 
though in this paper different sources are not used in order to ensure there are no data 
distortions.  
In turn, what is the RCULC and the RCWS is a matter affected by the specificities of the 
political economy of every country and -as Shaikh argues (Shaikh, A., 2016; pp. 648-649) 
- deeply affected by the political and negotiating strength of the labour force in 
comparison to that of pro-capital policies advocates. 
 
4.1.5. The Internal Balance equilibrium 
The Internal Balance is the function at which the economy is at its critical level of 
unemployment (Shaikh, A., 2016; pp. 648-650). The critical level of unemployment 
depends itself on the total demand for goods and services of the domestic economy 
(including the non-tradables). The points of the line are the points where neither there is 
on aggregate terms intense unemployment nor an excessive wage share which can 
decrease profitability and increase inflation. 
If ceteris paribus overall profitability of producing domestic goods and services 
(including non-tradables) relative to foreign goods and services increases (for exemple 
due to a positive shock on aggregate supply, a nominal depreciation, etc.) the country in 
question will experiment a decrease of its RER (it will gain competitivity) and the wage 
share will respond in a rise by pulling less productive labour on average into employment. 
On the other hand, if ceteris paribus its overall profitability decreases, the RER will 
increase and the wage share will decrease through redundancies of less productive labour. 
This is the reason why it has a negative slope. 
 
Internal balance equilibrium function:                            
RER= RER(basket of currencies) + RER(basket of currencies)- 
z*[ω(domestic)*100/ω(basket of currencies)] 
RER(basket of currencies)= 100 
z= elasticity of the effect of total demand for domestic goods and services on the RER of 
the currency. 
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Algebraically: 
PPI of Domestic Goods and Services/ PPI of Foreign Goods and Services 
z=PPI(domestic)/PPI(basket of foreign countries). 
Elements such as market rigidities, trade barriers, barriers of equivalent effect, transport 
costs, transaction costs, etc. will impact the PPIs and therefore z. 
4.1.6. Reduction of relative Unit Labour Costs and increase of the Wage Share 
According to the model, the reasons why a country can experiment at the same time -
prima facie paradoxically- reductions in the relative labour costs and increases of the 
wage share can take different forms: 1) Through intentional devaluation or depreciation 
of the nominal exchange rates of a currency. 2) Through a positive supply shock and/or 
through a reduction of other components of labour costs not included in the calculus of 
the wage share which outmatch increases in the wage share. Or 3) Through higher foreign 
RCULC than the domestic RCULC. 
Likewise, a country can experiment at the same time -prima facie paradoxically- increases 
in the relative labour costs and decreases of the wage share. Mainly either 1) Through 
intentional appreciation of the nominal exchange rates of a currency, 2) Through a 
negative supply shock and/or the increase of other components of labour costs not 
included in the calculus of the wage share which do not exceed the reduction in the wage 
share. 3) Through higher domestic RCULC than the foreign RCULC. 
 
4.1.7. Scatter Plot diagrams of the model 
Once I have developed this new macroeconomic model according to Shaikh’s theoretical 
foundations and Bootle’s assessments for the Eurozone countries, it is possible to show 
in various Scatter Plot diagrams what is the position of different countries and what have 
been their evolutions, either forming part of the Eurozone or another fix exchange rate 
regime or a floating one. It is important to stress that these diagrams show the evolution 
respect to the Euro Area mean, butit does not imply that the countries had necessary their 
RER in equilibrium in 1999Q1. They are an illustrative but not exact representation of 
the imbalances. 
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Figure 2. New Macroeconomic Balance Diagram with relevant Eurozone countries 
Source: Eurostat, ECB. 
 
Out of the 10 representative Euro Area countries represented in the diagram it is easy to 
see the effect of internal devaluation policies in peripheral countries (with the exception 
of Italy which shows little movement) between 2008 and 2016. Countries like Austria, 
Germany, Finland and France show the contrary movements with increased wage shares 
and relative Unit Labour Costs in 2016 indicating overall convergence although at a very 
slow pace due to Germany's policies aimed at ULC containment generating slower 
adjustment than needed. 
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Figure 3. Spain's internal devaluation 
Source: Eurostat, ECB. 
 
Given that within the Eurozone the effects of sizeable nominal exchange rate devaluations 
and appreciations predicted by the model cannot be confirmed it is necessary to select 
other countries with floating exchange rate regimes or pegged exchange rate regimes but 
experimenting sizeable nominal realignments. 
In order to achieve this, for the following graphs, the RER is approximated to the Real 
ULCT of a country deflated against the Euro Area and the EER-12 group of major trading 
partners (ECB SDW, 2017). 
It is worthy to note that different countries have different national equilibriums which can 
be statistically affected depending on the base year taken and the basket of foreign 
currencies considered. Even for the case of the Euro Area countries, they do not have 
exactly an equilibrium fixed to the 19 countries of the Eurozone, although they are their 
major economic partners, which could explain why some countries may show apparently 
very persistent imbalances respect to major Member States. 
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Moreover, the base year and the basket of foreign currencies selected affects the graphic 
representation of the broad four zones in which a country can find itself. 
Figure 4. Cases of sizeable nominal depreciations 
Source: Eurostat, ECB 
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Figure 5. Cases of sizeable nominal appreciations 
Source: Eurostat, ECB 
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Figure 6. The case of Sweden 
Source: Eurostat, ECB. 
 
The diagrams – leaving aside statistical distortions – show that nominal depreciations and 
appreciations of these currencies in the selected periods have the expected effects of the 
model. In the cases of Switzerland from 2008 to 2009 of Australia and Japan from 2009 
to 2010 it is noteworthy to appreciate that an expansionary fiscal policy can outweigh the 
anticipated movement generated by nominal appreciation. 
Moreover, the case of Sweden between 2008 and 2010 shows that -and in accordance to 
the Riksbank (Sveriges Riksbank, 2009; pp. 58)- that a nominal depreciation can be 
followed by an appreciation quite rapidly in countries with well-founded inflation 
expectations between the economic agents.  
Furthermore, this depreciation and appreciation movement of a national currency have 
major advantages over the situation of a country within a monetary union by allowing a 
rapid adjustment of external macroeconomic shocks. 
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The case of the United Kingdom between 2007 and 2008 is the result of a sizeable 
depreciation and a mild internal devaluation movement mixed. An example that a sizeable 
nominal depreciation along a mild internal devaluation can rapidly bring very significant 
competitiveness gains. 
 
4.2. PRODUCTIVITY 
 
Having established this model we will be better able to asses what exchange rate policies 
a country planning the withdrawal from the Euro should follow. 
As previously stated, there are basically on aggregate terms two levers of action for monetary and 
fiscal policy and in the range of movement of both levers there are two directions. Given that the 
abandonment of the Euro and of the Eurosystem permits the adjustment of the nominal exchange 
rate and of monetary policy towards the needs of the concerned countries it is possible to develop 
two main courses of action depending on the direction it is deemed desirable for them to go.  
 
Firstly, countries which had previously lost international competitiveness (increases in the Real 
Exchange Rate) due to an excessive rising wage share in the previous period should develop a 
strategy with nominal depreciation in mind given its overvalued exchange rate with other Member 
States. Countries which had previously gained competitiveness due to higher overall productivity 
increases or ULC containment should develop a strategy with appreciation in mind given its 
undervalued exchange rate with other Member States. 
 
Admittedly, countries seeking a nominal depreciation should not solely rely on competitive 
depreciation in order to restore external balance. The important aspect of nominal depreciation is 
that it allows much more rapid and painless flexibility to reduce the wage share through 
productivity increases instead of through very hard internal devaluations. 
 
As of 2016 the countries of the selected group which would need the most a depreciation of their 
currencies against the whole of the Eurozone would be Italy, Greece and Portugal and to a lesser 
extent Spain and Finland; and they should complement them with other moderately expansive 
fiscal measures. Germany would be the only country which would clearly need an appreciation 
of its currency relative to the rest of the Eurozone. The Netherlands, Belgium and France would 
29 
 
be able to choose a much more balanced “high road” approach of moderately higher productivity 
gains. 
4.3. BALANCE OF PAYMENTS AND INTERNATIONAL RESERVES 
4.3.1. Current Account Balance 
 
The Current Account balance is another very fundamental aspect, since – regardless of whether a 
surplus or a deficit is out of what would be the long term equilibrium – a positive current account 
balance would assure in the short and medium term (the length of time that a process of 
introduction of an NNC would take) hard-currency inflows into the country. This would very 
substantially reduce the likelihood of depletion of the National Central Bank’s international 
reserves and any subsequent balance of payments crisis and capital flights. 
 
Paradoxically – at least in appearance – a country experimenting an uncomfortably high current 
account deficit position (like Spain, Greece, Italy, Ireland and Portugal during the 2008-2011 
period) and under a framework of stringent macroeconomic fiscal limits, would find it easier to 
ensure a relatively smoother macroeconomic transition out of the Euro if it first engaged in some 
kind of internal devaluation rather than directly withdrawing. 
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4.3.2. Capital Account Balance 
 
Like in the case of the current account, a positive capital account balance and substantial 
international reserves at the starting point would contribute to an easier departure and to less 
stringent capital controls during the transition period. A negative capital account balance would 
spark the need for increased capital controls and bank nationalisations if the situation worsens. 
The point is to achieve during the transition period a sufficient inflow of international currencies 
as to not deplete the Central Bank’s international reserves. However given historical precedents 
which I will discuss later on, temporary capital controls should be applied in any case so that 
capital account fluctuations can be better managed. 
 
4.3.3. International Reserves 
 
Most Eurozone Central Banks during the period 2008-2016, specially the most hard-hit have been 
accumulating a substantial amount of foreign reserves in their balance sheets, which should 
facilitate  – although having to look on a case by case approach -  a smoother transition out of the 
Euro. Both for countries seeking a lower nominal exchange rate or a higher one with respect to 
the Euro. 
Austria
Belgium
Germany
Greece
France
Spain
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
-2,5
-2
-1,5
-1
-0,5
0
0,5
1
1,5
2
2,5
Figure 8. Capital Account Balance to GDP (2016)
2016
Country
(%
)
Source: Eurostat
31 
 
 
 
4.4. PUBLIC DEBTS AND PUBLIC DEFICITS 
 
The matter of public debts and public deficits is of great concern for these types of abandonment 
of currencies and/or fix exchange rates. Countries in need of a downward adjustment of the 
nominal exchange rate and its RER face overall higher fiscal deficits, Debt-to-GDP ratios and 
costs arising from interest. Moreover, some of them – specifically Greece, Portugal and Spain -
are forced to follow nominal convergence plans according to Excessive Deficit Procedures 
(European Commission, 2017). 
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4.5. NATIONAL BANKING SYSTEM 
 
The state of the national banking system is also an important factor to consider given that 
depending on its stress absorbing capacity to shocks caused by redenomination issues and changes 
in output due to nominal exchange rate movements the monetary policy of the National Central 
Bank -once autonomous– will have to be more or less expansive. This is the sector in which there 
would be the soonest spill-overs on other Eurozone and EU countries, as the Euro Area financial 
systems are very interconnected, having high cross-exposures according to a 2016 ECB's report 
on financial structures (ECB, 2016; pp. 11-21). 
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Different Financial Soundness Indicators compiled by the IMF make it possible to observe the 
overall condition of different national financial systems. Overall, the countries that have been 
identified as needing a nominal depreciation of their currencies show a higher amount of non-
performing loans and lower levels of capital against risk-weighted assets, meaning their national 
banking systems are more vulnerable to adverse shocks and therefore sufficient support ought to 
be designed in a departing strategy so as not to cause a banking crisis. On the other hand, countries 
such as Germany and the Netherlands show more robust figures, which minimises the need for 
support by the public sector. 
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5) THE SRATEGY FOR DEPARTURE: DIFFERENT PATHS DEPENDING ON THE 
STARTING POSITION 
 
The first thing to acknowledge is that the strategy for departure varies essentially around 
two very concrete aspects: whether the concerned State will devalue or appreciate the 
new national currency (and to what extent) and how the private economic agents expect 
it. It is possible to establish two general blocks of strategies: one contemplating nominal 
depreciation or nominal appreciation with respect to the Euro. Every country may show 
some specificities that can circumstantially modify some elements within these two grand 
strategies. 
 
Furthermore a very important practical and useful consideration to take into account is 
whether the national government which has determined to adopt an NNC has decided to 
do so when it is already in power or whether it has recently reached power after the 
pertinent elections with the electoral commitment of abandoning the Euro.  
 
It is useful to establish a temporal timeline in order to settle a common ground around 
which the different strategies can be designed: 
 
T(-1) Pre-introduction period. Determination of what is the macroeconomic situation of 
the country. It is also the time period during which preparations for the departure take 
place if possible. 
 
T(0) Introduction. Moment at which the NNC is declared the currency of legal tender and 
the first urgent accompanying introductory measures are established. 
 
T(1) Monetary Transition Period. Within this period the domestic economy deals with the 
phenomena associated with introduction and the nominal exchange rate adjustment. Other 
measures are put in place in order to guarantee the success of the monetary transition to 
a NNC. 
 
T(2) Normalisation. The domestic economy has overcome the transitory shocks and is on 
a sustainable path to growth and is decreasing the internal and/or external imbalances. 
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5.1. SECRECY AND IMMINENCE 
 
A possible -and preferred way- to introduce the new national currency would be if the 
government had successfully kept under secret all the necessary preparations for the 
introduction of a new national currency. Instrumental in achieving this would be reducing 
the time between preparation and the implementation of the new currency in order to 
increase the chances of being kept secret (Bootle, R.; 2012; pp. 31-33; 125-126). Secrecy 
would make possible the absence of expectations by private agents which could 
potentially distort the smoothness of the introduction and transition process. Furthermore, 
it would accelerate the monetary transition process given that for example the monetary 
base M(0) could be readily available to be rapidly introduced. 
 
However secrecy and imminence would have some considerable cons from a political 
point of view. For example: 
 
- Political costs for the incumbent government if the introduction is unsuccessful. 
- The lack of public debate about it. 
 
- The lack of a direct democratic mandate to undertake it. 
 
- The almost near impossibility of reaching an agreement between different political 
parties of the legislative bodies and -at least within a variable amount of time depending 
of course on the balance of power in the legislative- to previously make the exclusive 
monetary sovereignty as part of the Constitutional identity of the State and the National 
Central Bank as the exclusive centre for conducting monetary policy. This is, as I have 
said earlier, a useful action to impede the Court of Justice of the European Union from 
sentencing the measure as invalid. 
 
So, to recapitulate, for an incumbent government secrecy and imminence would be indeed 
very valuable tools to introduce smoothly the new national currency. If after some weeks 
or a few months of preparation a government were able to introduce the new currency in 
one blow and force the redenomination of assets, liabilities, contracts, etc. governed by 
domestic law within the country the period of Monetary Transition could be much 
quicker. 
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Alas, a political party which had risen to power after an election with the commitment to 
abandon the Euro would not be able to undertake all preparations in secrecy. Therefore 
another way has to be found to make the transition possible in such a case. 
 
All in all, secrecy would play a much bigger role in facilitating the transition in the case 
of a country seeking to depreciate the NNC because it would reduce the likelihood of 
bank panics and/or speculative attacks. In the case of an appreciation a lot of the 
concerned national economic agents would gladly welcome (at least in its short and 
medium term effects) the introduction of a national currency and extensive 
redenominations of assets such as bank deposits, given that the currency would appreciate 
representing a free increase on their wealth and income with respect to foreign goods, 
services, etc. 
 
5.2. REDENOMINATIONS 
 
One of the most tricky aspects of the process of introducing a new currency is what 
redenominations of existent and future contracts, assets, liabilities, prices, taxes, etc. are put in 
place in order to make the transition from the Euro to the new currency effectively (Bootle, R.; 
2012; pp. 55-64).  
 
All future contracts, assets, liabilities, prices, payments of taxes should be denominated in NNC, 
which would be the sole currency of legal tender. Immediate redenomination should have as a 
necessary element the redenomination into the new currency of all existing public debts (Bootle, 
R.; 2012; pp. 16-17). 
 
A movement easy to foresee in financial markets – if the private financial agents expected it - 
would be the increase in secondary markets of the risk premia of the concerned State’s liabilities 
(including government bonds) in the cases where the country had an overvalued national currency 
and the government were planning to default on part of its debt or a redenomination of this debt 
and its subsequent devaluation. 
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Governments with fiscal deficits over 3% and/or high volumes of debt, would find it necessary to 
redenominate their debts in order to avoid the counteracting effect of devaluation of the NNC 
relative to the Euro on the volume of debt and the cost of debt servicing. Not redenominating 
these debts would make them subject to exchange rate risk and grow in their relative weight in 
accordance with the magnitude of the devaluation (Bootle, R.; 2012; pp. 16-17). New public debt 
denominated in the NNC would allow the country not to have exchange rate risk on its public 
debt, which has proved to be one of the most problematic macroeconomic headaches for 
governments around the world (Da Costa, G.C.; 1991; pp. 443). 
 
The contrary movement (decreases in risk premia) would arguably take place in case the 
concerned national currency had an undervalued exchange rate and the government were planning 
an appreciation, although this effect would be very small and of little significance for the country 
at hand, since these countries already present the lowest interest rates on sovereign bonds. 
 
National specificities in this regard are very important to be pondered. For example, in the case 
of Greece, the government was forced to reject the possibility of redenomination in 2012 of a 
substantial part of the public debt which passed into being governed by British law (Bootle, R.; 
2012; pp. 56). Therefore, in the case of Greece the focus should be put into restructuring and 
default on public debt. 
 
Bootle in his Practical Guide elaborates a table presenting Greece as an example and what is the 
situation of different kinds of debtors and their obligations whether they have obligations under 
domestic law or under international law (Bootle, R.; 2012; pp. 56). 
 
Following his example, I replicate the table adding to it the modifications that I think would be 
suitable for a strategy with depreciation in mind. 
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Table 1. Redenominations in the strategy of depreciation 
Debtor Domestic Law International Law 
Sovereign As most public debts are governed by 
domestic law, there is minimal risk of 
successful litigation to oppose the 
redenominations. In particularly hard-hit 
countries, the government may need to 
restructure or reduce the debt stock in 
addition to redenomination.  
Otherwise, redenomination should be 
enough. 
For those public debts which are governed by 
another Member State's law. The national 
government does not have the ability to 
unilaterally re denominate them. Unilateral 
redenominations would probably ruled out by 
foreign courts. If necessary, the government 
could negotiate to restructure the debt where it 
would be needed or default on part of these 
debts. 
Non-financial 
corporations 
“Resolution of these debts should be 
determined by the parties involved. The 
legal position may need to be tested in 
court and may vary depending on the 
circumstances of individual firms 
whether or not the creditor is based in” 
the withdrawing State. “But the 
presumption is that they would be 
redenominated into” the NNC. 
“The courts would probably rule that debt 
contracted by domestic companies governed 
by another State's law under international law 
and owed to creditors outside the concerned 
State should continue to be denominated in 
Euro. However, many companies may be 
unable to service these debts after exit and 
devaluation. In such cases creditors and 
debtors could be left to reach an agreement on 
how to restructure these debts through a mix of 
redenomination, restructuring and 
bankruptcy. But there may be a case for 
government involvement to coordinate and 
push for redenomination. The best solution 
may vary between countries.” 
Household debt “Most of the household consumer loans 
and mortgages would be contracted 
under domestic law and would be 
redenominated.” 
“Loans from core economies to households in 
Greece would be treated in the same way as 
corporate borrowing described above. Ideally, 
they should be redenominated.” 
Banking Sector  The banking sector does not  
redenominate deposits.  
The government redenominates all other 
liabilities of all banks and subsidiaries 
operating in the country. It will have to 
redenominate its assets governed by 
domestic consumer loans, mortgages and 
public debt and gradually those of non-
financial corporations. 
Subsidiaries of national banks operating “in 
other countries would not have their balance 
sheets redenominated.” 
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The main modification I make with regard to Bootle's approach to redenomination is that the 
banking sector (more precisely, depository institutions) would not have its deposits 
redenominated. 
 
The rationale for doing this is that not redenominating deposits, one of the most liquid assets of 
household and corporations would provide ample flexibility for them to comply with their 
obligations governed by other Member State's law and they could use them to prioritise their most 
important imports once the currency starts to depreciate. Moreover, the guarantee of non-
redenomination of deposits (even providing indirect incentives to deposit more funds) would 
substantially reduce the risk of runs on depository institutions and facilitate a smoother transition. 
More about this will be explained in the Transitory pure credit system. 
 
The obvious con is that the banking sector in face of mainly depreciating assets but deposits 
denominated in Euros would face insolvency issues. Although -as it will be explained later- 
depreciation would be orchestrated gradually to reduce the year-on-year effect, there are 3 non-
exclusive main options that I propose that could be used in conjunction if it is deemed necessary 
to avoid systemic issues: 
1) Nationalization: The government becomes a shareholder and increases the capital of systemic 
entities to counter the effects of redenomination. 
 
2) Bail-in: Bank creditors are forced to bear some of the burden. Part of their credits are turned 
into capital of the entities and/or face write-offs. 
 
3) Monetary refinancing. The NCB creates a special line of assistance credit to deal with issues 
arising from redenomination. 
 
5.3. INTRODUCTION OF THE NEW CURRENCY OF LEGAL TENDER 
 
So, how should the new currency be introduced? Which measures ought to be 
implemented for this introduction? 
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First and foremost -if possible- the production of the monetary base should be undertaken 
at T(-1) and could be reduced to some weeks according to Bootle's estimates (Bootle R., 
2012; pp. 142-144) due to the urgency of the situation and subcontracting the production 
of initial notes to other printings besides the official national ones in order to be already 
available at T(0). Notwithstanding, in the case of a party coming into power this would 
be much more difficult to do and would prompt the necessity to introduce the NNC as a 
currency of legal tender without the monetary base ready. 
 
At T(0) the statute or internal regulation of the National Central Bank should be modified 
by decree -preferably- or by express parliamentary procedure. Articles referring to the 
membership of the NCB to the European System of Central Bank and to the Eurosystem 
ought to be reformulated eliminating the membership to the Eurosystem but keeping that 
to the ESCB (given that the concerned State would still be member of the EU). 
 
The NNC should be established by decree -preferably- or by express parliamentary 
procedure as the sole currency of legal tender at T(0). All future contracts within the 
country should be denominated in NNC and all taxes paid in NNC at a parity of 1:1, 
which coincides with Bootle's assessment (Bootle R., 2012; pp. 41, 141). Factually, in 
any case, there would be in place a bi-monetary payments system (in its broadest sense), 
since a lot of underground economy operations and operations with agents arising from 
contracts governed by the State's Private International Law and governed by another 
Member State's law would still have to be settled in Euros.  
 
The reason for making the NNC the sole legal tender is to force the conversion as rapid as possible 
from a Euro-based payments system to a NNC-based system. I argue that this strategy would 
generate an NNC-based payments system: 
 
- With adequate coercive stimulus. 
- Without the need of any intermediate alternative. 
- Providing at the same time discretion to private economic agents to adjust their balances, their 
monetary flows and their contracts in their most convenient terms possible. 
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- With a substantially minimized risk of runs on depository institutions. Given that existing 
deposits would not be redenominated. 
- With a reduction of the extent to which controls on deposits and capital controls would be 
necessary to ensure the transition. 
- With relatively easiness to adapt on the part of the financial sector. Even more so with the 
creation by the Central Bank of a credit line to deal with the issues of redenomination besides 
nationalization or bail-in approaches. 
 
5.4. TRANSITORY PURE CREDIT SYSTEM 
 
In the cases where secret preparations have not been able to take place beforehand, an 
inescapable issue about introducing a new currency of legal tender in such short notice is 
that there is no prepared monetary base for the conventional functioning of a fiat currency 
monetary system. 
 
Using Perry G. Mehrling's framework of the essentials of monetary economics (Mehrling, 
P., 2016; pp. 7-12) the “Hierarchy of Money” within a country is dominated at the top by 
the currency of legal tender's cash (in the case of fiat systems). 
 
The movement to be achieved in the concerning case is the rapid substitution of the 
internal pyramid -being an established conventional pyramid- for a pyramid without a 
monetary base. 
 
Given that cash is being temporary eliminated as a means of final settlement there is the 
need to foster alternatives to avoid unnecessary restrictions of payments within the 
economy due to the Scarcity of Ultimate Money of the Currency Principle (Mehrling, P., 
2016; pp. 11-12). This in turn means that until a new base is introduced, the top layer of 
a traditional Hierarchy of Money within a country is flattened. 
 
All domestic transactions would have to be settled electronically or through other more 
traditional means of settlement such as checks, etc. during the transition period as means 
of final settlement.  
 
44 
 
Moreover, in order to avoid a potential credit crunch -in the absence of M0 as the means 
of final settlement- the State should facilitate the settlement of payments through different 
measures, like encouraging and facilitating debit and credit card use, the use of checks, 
etc. and adapting as fast as possible all the software related with these kinds of payment 
operations (Bootle R., 2012; pp. 42-43). 
 
Through one way or another, all economic agents would have to open new bank accounts 
denominated in NNC and transfer funds to them in order to carry out the necessary 
transactions and settlements. The State in all cases should facilitate this or directly 
intervene to make this effective as soon as possible. Forcing financial entities to open new 
accounts which should have to be denominated in NNC next to those denominated in 
Euros for the same customers would possibly be the most straightforward way. 
 
Through this approach economic agents would have to adapt as fast as possible, operate 
with the NNC without unnecessary delays and they would be able to reserve their 
disposable assets in Euros for their most important contractual obligations and needs with 
foreign agents, adding substantial flexibility of adjustment to the transition process.  
 
Furthermore, I argue that existent deposits should not be redenominated and inflows in 
Euros to these deposits should be allowed. Also, it should not be made possible to 
reconvert NNC of the deposits into Euros. This should have an attraction effect on 
economic agents wanting to reduce the effect on their net wealth in the cases where the 
government aimed at a strategy with gradual depreciation in mind. 
 
Given that all other major assets (such as properties, durable goods such as vehicles, etc.) 
of the private sector would have to be sooner or later redenominated in order to pay the 
correspondent taxes and there would be temporary controls with the exterior, economic 
agents would be inclined to transfer resources to deposits in Euros. This indirect incentive 
should contribute to avoid bank runs and limit financial turmoil and ensure a transition as 
smooth as possible through this kind of guided pure credit system. 
 
In the case where a strategy of appreciation of the currency there would not be the need 
of these kind of tactics, since depositors would more than welcome a direct 
redenomination of their accounts into a currency which would gain and therefore 
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redenomination could be applied almost in full to the domestic banking sector as Bootle 
argues (Bootle R., 2012; pp. 61). 
 
 
5.5 TEMPORARY CAPITAL CONTROLS 
 
The departure of not only the Euro, but also from any other pegged or a fix exchange rate 
system is a process which can be subject to speculative attacks against the national 
currency which can very substantially undermine the economic policies of the State. 
Furthermore, the possibility of runs in depository institutions and shadow banking 
institutions – which can never be ruled out- due to the expectations of change of the 
exchange rate risks is potentially a very serious threat which could undermine the efforts 
towards effective normalisation. 
 
This is why, in all circumstances, whether the country was planning to undertake a gradual 
depreciation or appreciation of the nominal exchange rate, the concerned State should 
establish temporary capital controls as an emergence measure needed to preserve public 
policy within the State. 
The primary and secondary law of the EU covers such cases of emergency capital 
controls. More specifically, Article 65(1) of the Consolidated version of the TFEU would 
be the legal basis upon these temporary capital controls would be lawful and which have 
already been applied in the cases of for instance Cyprus between 2013 and 2015 and 
Greece in 2015. The grounds upon which temporary restrictions on the movement of 
capitals can be set up are summarised by the European Commission (European 
Commission, 2016). 
 
The extent to which these temporary capital controls should be applied would have to be 
determined based on the expectations by the government of what would be the effects on 
the economic agents and they could be extended in the cases where it factually it is being 
not enough to counter pernicious movements. 
 
The movements of private economic agents and the determination of the extent of the 
controls needed revolve fundamentally around how the redenominations according to the 
NCC will be made during the introduction and the transition period. 
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At the end of the transition phase the temporal capital controls would have to be lifted. 
With the redenomination strategy put forward in this paper, capital controls would still 
have to be applied in all cases but -as previously stated- they have been designed so that 
capital controls may not be as stringent as initially considered. 
 
The cases of the strategies of Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea compared to that of Malaysia 
and Argentina are -although presenting different approaches themselves- a very strong case in 
favour of capital controls during the abandonment of fixed exchange rates and/or more generic 
currency crises (Lim, M-H. and Goh, Soo-Khoon., pp. 5-7, 17-18). 
  
Table 2. Major recent Devaluations and Ensuing GDP Loss 
Country Date Months 
Until Trough 
with 
Devaluation 
Currency 
per 
Dollar 
Before 
Currency 
per 
Dollar 
Through 
Size of 
Devaluation 
Quarters 
until 
Through 
Loss of 
GDP 
Change in 
GDP 3 Years 
After 
Devaluation 
Argentina Jan 
'01 
5 1 3,6 -72,2% 2 -4,9% 17,2% 
Finland Sep 
'92 
11 4,4 5,8 -23,9% 4 -2,4% 6,8% 
Indonesia Jul 
'97 
12 2446,6 13962,5 -82,5% 5 -13,4% -7,9% 
Malaysia Sep 
'97 
4 2,7 4,4 -37,8% 5 -8,5% 6,7% 
South 
Korea 
Dec 
'97 
1 1025,6 1701,5 -39,7% 2 -9,1 14,0% 
Sweden Nov 
'92 
6 6,2 8,1 -22,8% 2 -0,4% 8,9% 
Thailand Jul 
'97 
9 25,8 53,8 -52,1% 5 -14,2% -4,7% 
Latvia 2007
Q4 
24 0,49 0,48 2,1% 8 -24,1% -21,3% 
 
Source: Weisbrot, M. and Ray, R., Latvia’s Internal Devaluation: A Success Story?, CEPR, 
(Washington, D.C., 2011). pp. 7. 
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The first three were carried out through freely floating nominal exchange rates, without the 
establishment of capital controls and having to accord loan programmes with the IMF conditioned 
to sets of orthodox macroeconomic policies (Rodrik, D. and Kaplan, E., 2001). 
 
According to economist Dani Rodrik (Rodrik, D. and Kaplan, E., 2001) the experience of 
Malaysia -which showed a better adaptability to the adjustment than the other three cases without 
having to accord IMF programmes- along with other countries such as Chile has changed 
orthodox perception of capital controls, alas very slowly.  
 
I would argue that a strategy aimed at not having to accord aid programmes from international 
organizations like the IMF is much preferred in view that it does not drastically constrain the sets 
of economic policies to undertake and that institutions like the IMF hold preferred creditor status, 
which further difficults unilateral actions in cases of redenomination and default (Schadler, S., 
2014). 
 
5.6. THE EXCHANGE RATE POLICY: ORDERLY DEVALUATION OR 
DEPRECIATION 
 
Once determined whether the adequate path for the NNC should be to depreciate or 
appreciate what must be determined is how to manage the convertibility of the currency 
and the exchange rate policy during the transition period. 
 
In the transition phase, the NNC should not be made freely convertible against other 
currencies until the monetary base of the NNC is ready, the conversion ought to pass 
through administrative process in this phase. The government will have discretion as to 
when to make the NNC convertible and therefore should decide the best moment. 
 
Floating and completely flexible exchange rates against the Euro would not be a good 
option since in the case of very sudden movements of the nominal exchange rates these 
could spark financial panics which could entail unnecessary defaults by private economic 
agents and capital outflows in the absence of adequate capital controls. 
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I argue that the depreciation or appreciation could be much better managed through the 
combination of temporary capital controls and a pegged exchange rate system against the 
Euro and/or the Dollar (the most relevant currencies for the concerned country’s Real 
Exchange Rate) departing from a 1:1 parity.  
 
I think these pegged exchange rates -starting at a reference parity of 1:1- should be let to 
move within bands of fluctuation of, for example, around +/- 6%, akin to the cases of the 
currencies in the former EMS which were allowed higher fluctuation bands against the 
Deutsch Mark (Ledesma et altri, 2008; pp. 8) which were the Pound, Lira, Peseta and 
Escudo). This peg should be coupled with objectives of nominal exchange rate 
depreciation or appreciation, adjusting downwards or upwards the reference value until 
the external equilibrium is approximately met. This point would mark a very important 
milestone in the transition period and would be the confirmation of a successful process. 
During this process, given that departing from a 1:1 parity the nominal exchange rates 
should move through this adjustable pegged system, the National Central Bank would 
have to defend the parity if need be. That is the reason why -coupled with temporary 
capital controls- a positive current account for the departing country -although not 
essential- would make the defence of the parity easier. The central bank would be able to 
have at its disposal a continuous stream of foreign currencies with which to defend the 
parity. This would make possible not to rely solely on foreign currency reserves and ad 
hoc purchases of the requested currencies by the NCB.  
 
It is also important to acknowledge that in order to defend the parity if need be, the NCB 
would probably not find it possible to convince the ECB to symmetrically defend the 
parity, as the unilateral withdrawal from the Eurosystem would not be well welcomed and 
there would be issues such as the value of sovereign bonds on the balance sheet of other 
NCBs and also TARGET2 balances which would probably stir conflict. 
 
So, once arrived at the approximate equilibrium point for the nominal exchange rate, the 
government could decide either to maintain a peg with the Euro and/or the Dollar or let it 
float flexibly according to the foreign exchange markets. But the discussion of what is 
better: pegged or floating exchange rates under normal circumstances? Goes a bit beyond 
the aim of this dissertation, since the normalisation period for the NNC would have been 
already achieved. 
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5.7. THE ROLE OF THE NCB AND ITS POLICY 
 
Once monetary sovereignty is no longer shared and full autonomy is returned to the NCB what 
monetary policy and how the Central Bank ought to undertake it is of vital importance for 
reaching a normalisation period as fast as possible. 
 
As the aim is to exit the Euro without leaving the European Union -which in any case could be 
done later on and much more calmly once the heat of the abandonment of the Euro has passed- 
the NCB would still form part of the ESCB. This implies that -in any case- in the setting of the 
new monetary policy the NCB must be independent from political discretion of the executive 
powers of the State and that it must not engage in primary monetary financing of the government. 
However, within these political and primary monetary financing limits the NCB can engage in 
other kinds of monetary policies. Most notably, unconventional monetary policies or different 
maximum and minimum inflation targets. 
 
As previously pointed out, I advocate that the Central Bank could and should create a credit 
facility to deal with redenomination efforts on the part of the banking sector in depreciation cases. 
There would be the pressing need for bank recapitalisation and refinancing which could be eased 
through an expansive monetary policy coherent with gradual depreciation. 
 
Besides the banking sector, private agents would need to roll over part of their existing debts 
denominated in Euros governed by another Member State's law so as not to face excessive 
liquidity constrains. Furthermore, tenants of public debts would face a depreciation of their assets 
in the future, and so, would want to compensate with some refinancing flexibility. 
 
In the case of a country seeking an appreciation the monetary policy would arguably be let to 
tighten in order to increase interest rates pressing the nominal exchange rate to rise. 
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5.7.1. The TARGET2 system 
 
One important aspect to discuss is what is the new relationship of the NCB with the rest of the 
Central Banks of the Eurosystem and of the ESCB. More specifically, what actions should the 
government undertake regarding the NBC's relation with TARGET2 and SSP, the interbank real-
time gross settlement system and technical platform used by the Eurosystem. 
 
As stated in article 1 of the consolidated version of the ECB's decision concerning the terms and 
condition of TARGET2, the participation in the system is not precluded to Eurosystem NCBs and 
the ECB (ECB, 2007; pp. 71). In fact other NCBs of the ESCB are direct participants, like 
Denmark, Poland, Romania and Bulgaria (ECB, 2016). 
 
So, a withdrawing Member State from the Euro and the Eurosystem would not necessary have to 
leave the TARGET2. As Karl Whelan underscores: “The Intra-Eurosystem assets and liabilities 
generated by TARGET2 have no maturity associated with them: There is no date set by which 
these claims need to be settled. Rather the TARGET2 liabilities are honoured by making interest 
payments that are charged at the same rate the ECB charges to banks in its Main Refinancing 
Operation (MRO). These interest 'payments are collected by the ECB and redistributed 
proportionately to those central banks that have positive TARGET2 claims […] it should be 
emphasised that TARGET2 claims do not have any collateral associated with them. They are a 
claim on the ECB, which has a legal right to create Euros and so collateral is not considered 
necessary.” (Whelan K., 2012; pp.10). 
 
This is of extreme relevance because this scenario is legally preferable for countries like Italy or 
Spain which hold very large negative credit balances in TARGET2 as of December 2016 as it can 
be observed in the following graphic: 
If a country in this situation decided to file for an insolvency procedure and/or declare a default 
of its TARGET2 PM account it is stated in article 30 that “1. The ECB shall have a pledge over 
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the participant's existing and future credit balances on its PM accounts, thereby collateralising 
any current and future claims arising out of the legal relationship between the parties. 
 
2. On the occurrence of: 
(a) an event of default referred to in Article 28(1); or 
(b) any other event of default or event referred to in Article 28(2) that has led to  
the termination or suspension of the participant's participation in TARGET2- ECB” 
 
Furthermore, as stated in article 38: “The bilateral relationship between the ECB and participants 
in TARGET2-ECB shall be governed by the law of the Federal Republic of Germany». 
 
This means that in cases where a Member State had a positive credit balance or not significant in 
terms of the size of its NCBs balance sheet, withdrawing from TARGET2 would pose no 
headache. Alas, strikingly, creditor participants have no right recognised in the ECB's decision 
regarding collateralisation of their claims arising out of TARGET2. 
 
Italy
Spain
ECB
Greece
Portugal
Austria
Belgium
France
Finland
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Germany
-600000
-400000
-200000
0
200000
400000
600000
800000
1000000
Figure 18. TARGET2 balances (December 2016)
Country
M
ill
io
n
s
 
o
f E
u
ro
s
Source: ECB
52 
 
A country with a negative credit balance could not redenominate this balance applying the 
principle of Lex Monetae (because the relations are governed by German Law) and if it were to 
default it is arguable that the CJEU would enforce the ECB's rights of pledge over the NCB in 
question, which could threaten the future monetary policy of the then autonomous NCB by -for 
instance- having to compensate the ECB with reserves of foreign currency. 
 
5.7.2. Painless debt reduction for hard hit countries 
 
Countries which have been affected the most by the crisis and the lack of flexibility have the 
option to take a remarkably effective and economically painless way to rapidly improve their 
macroeconomic situation if needed. It consists on defaulting on the sovereign bonds held by the 
ECB and other NCBs (the domestic NCB can also be included). 
 
As Mario Draghi stated (Draghi, 2017) and observable in the previous graphic, the ECB and the 
NCBs of the core (such as Germany, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) have acquired through 
the APP and the PSPP a very large amount of assets and sovereign bonds in order to conduct 
unconventional monetary, which is reflected on their positive TARGET 2 balance. 
 
Defaulting on these bonds would generate a very signifcant reduction of the gross debt stock of 
the hard hit defaulting country and an associated reduction of the costs of debt servicing, which 
would allow a significant shift of the public sector expenditure towards other sectors. 
 
As Paul De Grauwe and Yuemei Ji argue (De Grauwe, P. and Ji, Y., 2013), Central Banks do not 
have liquidity or solvency constrains under a fiat currency system and can make up for any losses 
provided they do not go against the objective price stability. 
 
The Central Banks of the core and the ECB would have no factual need to be recapitalised by 
their national governments in cases of large asset losses and could create a vehicle to allow their 
NCBs (and also applicable to the ECB) an easy recapitalisation given their monopoly on the 
creation of money. In turn, this action would not generate inflation risk given that it would not 
increase the monetary base. 
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This strategy along with such a reaction from the ECB and the core NCBs would make it possible 
to transfer a substantial amount of the problems of redenomination and asset depreciation to these 
Central Banks, which are the authorities that do not have liquidity or solvency constrains to 
operate. It would mean an extremely valuable tool for exiting the economic malaise without any 
taxpayer or -more generally- any private economic agent to bear the costs of sovereign bonds 
defaults. 
 
6) EXPECTED MACROECONOMIC RESULTS 
 
It is possible to estimate the macroeconomic results of the withdrawal from the Euro and the 
subsequent nominal depreciation or appreciation according to other historical episodes. The main 
reference for this section is a CESifo Institut paper of 2012 assessing the historical experience of 
currency crises in 70 countries after 1980 (Born, B. et altri, 2012). 
 
The paper shows that even in such a wide spectrum of countries the velocity of adjustment due to 
nominal depreciation of the exchange rate is much faster than an internal devaluation process, 
taking just 2 years on average to recover the initial level of GDP (Born, B. et altri, 2012; pp. 9). 
Another reference paper is a CEPR paper (Weisbrot, M. and Ray, R., 2011), which compared the 
case of Latvia -which was heralded as an internal devaluation example- with a contemporary set 
of countries which experimented sizeable nominal depreciations and clearly better performances. 
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Table 3. Major recent Devaluations and Ensuing GDP Loss 
Country Date Months Until 
Trough with 
Devaluation 
Currency 
per 
Dollar 
Before 
Currency 
per 
Dollar 
Through 
Size of 
Devaluation 
Quarters 
until 
Through 
Loss of 
GDP 
Change in 
GDP 3 
Years After 
Devaluation 
Argentina Jan 
'01 
5 1 3,6 -72,2% 2 -4,9% 17,2% 
Finland Sep 
'92 
11 4,4 5,8 -23,9% 4 -2,4% 6,8% 
Indonesia Jul 
'97 
12 2446,6 13962,5 -82,5% 5 -13,4% -7,9% 
Malaysia Sep 
'97 
4 2,7 4,4 -37,8% 5 -8,5% 6,7% 
South 
Korea 
Dec 
'97 
1 1025,6 1701,5 -39,7% 2 -9,1 14,0% 
Sweden Nov 
'92 
6 6,2 8,1 -22,8% 2 -0,4% 8,9% 
Thailand Jul 
'97 
9 25,8 53,8 -52,1% 5 -14,2% -4,7% 
Latvia 2007
Q4 
24 0,49 0,48 2,1% 8 -24,1% -21,3% 
 
Source: Weisbrot, M. and Ray, R., Latvia’s Internal Devaluation: A Success Story?, CEPR, 
(Washington, D.C., 2011). pp. 7. 
 
Generally, very sharp nominal depreciations of national currencies are followed by temporary 
above average peaks of inflation due to increased costs of the imports (Bootle R., 2012; pp. 166-
167). The sharpest the nominal fall and the ratios of imports to GDP the biggest is the pressure 
for inflation to increase, which can be reduced depending on the utilization capacity of the 
economy (Bootle R., 2012; pp. 52-53). 
 
Given that the selected Euro Area countries -as seen in the New Macroeconomic Balance 
Diagram- needing a depreciation are at a better starting point with regards to labour costs and 
Real Exchange Rate than in 2008 (except in Finland and only very moderately in Italy) due to the 
processes of slow and severe internal devaluation the falls in their nominal exchanges would be 
able to be much more subdued than in other contemporary cases.  
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Moreover, in countries operating well below output capacity inflationary pressures due to 
increases in the cost of imports would be partially cushioned in a transition period given the higher 
overall ability to adjust the national supply to meet circumstantial peaks of higher demand. 
 
Table 4. Current level of capacity utilization in manufacturing industry 
Countries 2015Q1 2015Q2 2015Q3 2015Q4 2016Q1 2016Q2 2016Q3 2016Q4 
Germany 83,6 84,7 84,7 84,4 84,3 84,8 85,2 85,8 
Euro 
Area 
80,3 81,4 81,6 81,4 81,3 81,5 82 82,4 
Finland 77,7 79,7 79,9 79,3 78,6 78,6 74,2 80,7 
Portugal 80,6 79,6 80,7 80,3 79,6 80,2 80,2 80,2 
Spain 76,7 77,9 78 78 77,8 78,2 79 79,2 
Italy 74 75,5 76 76,3 76,6 75,7 76,4 76,1 
Greece 69,1 67,4 63 64,2 66,3 68,6 67,4 68,8 
 
Source: Eurostat 
Furthermore, the gradual depreciation strategy I advocate within some moderate fluctuation bands 
coupled with and expansive monetary policy and capital controls would buffer the initial negative 
shock that these economies experienced through their nominal depreciations and provide more 
stability to the adjustment process. 
In summation -and according to past experiences (Born, B. et altri, 2012; pp. 9), (Weisbrot, M. 
and Ray, R., 2011, pp. 7)- the period of economic normalisation should be reached after 1 or 2 
years of the introduction of the new currency. The length may mostly vary depending on the 
gradualness desired and on the ability of the government to resist potential speculative attacks on 
the value of the NNC once convertible. 
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7) SUMMARY OF THE STRATEGIES FOR DEPARTURE 
 
Table 5. Summary of the strategy towards nominal depreciation 
Time Developments 
T(-1): Decision to 
leave the Eurozone. 
Once the decision is taken, all necessary arrangements for to the introduction 
of the NNC should be kept secret and to be undertaken as fast as possible so 
as the be ready at the moment of introduction. Nonetheless, there may be cases 
where it is not possible to have had these preparations beforehand. In such 
cases -and most importantly- the government will not be able to count with a 
readily available M0 nor other technical preparations. 
T(0): Introduction The internal statute of the national central bank is changed through decree or express 
legal proceeding. The NCB is no longer part of the Eurosystem. New sole currency 
of legal tender by decree or express legal proceedings. Independent rule-based central 
bank. Suspension of activity in the ECB’s decisions. Temporary capital controls 
established. 
 
A 1:1 parity is established and enforced between the NNC and the Euro. All existing 
public debts are immediately redenominated into the new currency and those held by 
Central Banks are defaulted on. All new banking notations, contracts (including 
labour contracts, etc.), public debts, etc. must be denominated in the new currency.  
Existing sector assets, debts and contracts governed by domestic law are 
redenominated excluding bank deposits. Private economic agents are left discretion 
to use their assets in Euros to prioritize existing and future contracts with an 
international law dimension which would be more costly to redenominate and 
restructure successfully. 
 
Establishment of a temporary pure credit system of the new currency without M0 if 
it has not been possible to produce it beforehand. There is a flattening of the pyramid 
of the hierarchy of money and creation of the new M0 has to be reduced to some 
weeks. The NCB ought to have an adequate amount of reserves in Euros and hard 
currencies to ensure a smooth transition and reach macroeconomic normalisation 
without any balance of payments crisis. 
T(1): Monetary 
Transition Period. 
After the immediate actions of T(0), the government starts the Monetary Transition 
period. The M0 for the new national currency has to be ready and distributed.  
 
A 1-to-2 year period of macroeconomic adjustment starts. Gradual depreciation of 
the currency through a downwards-adjusting peg system. The banking sector and 
some private agents face difficulties due to depreciation but are eased off thanks to 
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Time Developments 
the Central Bank establishing a special credit line to deal with redenomination issues.  
Nationalizations and/or Bail-in procedures are also potential options. 
T(2) Normalisation Closing of the output gaps and increasing productivity. New equilibrium of growth 
enjoying autonomous monetary sovereignty. 
 
Table 6. Summary of the strategy towards nominal appreciation 
Time Developments 
T(-1): Decision to 
leave the Eurozone. 
The government can prepare the monetary base beforehand while enjoying a much 
more relaxed internal and external situation. 
T(0): Introduction When the moment is determined as ripe the internal statute of the National Central 
Bank is changed through decree or express legal proceeding, the NCB is no longer 
part of the Eurosystem. New sole currency of legal tender by decree or express legal 
proceedings. Independent rule-based central bank. Suspension of activity in the 
ECB’s decisions. 
 
The internal statute of the national central bank is changed through decree or 
express legal proceeding. The NCB is no longer part of the Eurosystem. New sole 
currency of legal tender by decree or express legal proceedings. Independent rule-
based central bank. Suspension of activity in the ECB’s decisions. Temporary capital 
and financial controls established. 
 
A 1:1 parity is established and enforced between the NNC and the Euro. All existing 
public debts are immediately redenominated into the new currency. All new banking 
notations, contracts (including labour contracts, etc.) public debts, etc. must be 
denominated in the new currency.  Existing private sector assets and debts governed 
by domestic law are redenominated, including bank deposits). 
 
In case where there has not been the possibility of prior preparations the 
establishment of a temporary pure credit system of the new currency without M0 is 
needed. Flattening of the pyramid of the hierarchy of money. Creation as fast as 
possible of new M0. The NCB ought to have an adequate amount of reserves in Euros 
to ensure a smooth transition and complete the following economic normalisation 
without any balance of payments crisis. 
58 
 
Time Developments 
T(1): Monetary 
Transition Period. 
After the immediate actions of T(0), the government starts the Monetary Transition 
period. Starts a 1-to-2 year period of complete macroeconomic adjustment. Gradual 
appreciation of the currency. No real need at all of unconventional monetary policy, 
it could be pursued but it is not required. Owners (both domestic and external) of 
domestic assets and creditors of debts previously denominated in Euros benefit of 
the conversion to a new appreciating currency. Debtors of debts previously 
denominated in Euros and redenominated in a new appreciating currency absorb the 
most part of the redenomination costs. 
 
T(2) Normalisation The country's current account surplus is reduced to an overall more sustainable 
situation. Other countries’ tradable sectors benefit substantially if the leaving 
country’s economy is big enough, but debtors from other countries of 
redenominated contracts suffer from an appreciating NNC. 
 
8) CONCLUSIONS 
 
In this Master thesis my main contributions to point out are: 
 
- A theoretical framework to assess what are the policies needed for a country to maintain its 
approximate equilibrium. 
 
- The design of two main strategies to withdraw from the Euro gathering information from other 
economists which have thoroughly analysed the matter. I add and modify some aspects that I as 
an economist think would help making a withdrawal less disruptive. 
 
Although bold and with unavoidable difficulties the unilateral exit of a country from the Eurozone 
and the Eurosystem is feasible and can be best managed following one of the two main strategies 
so as not to distort excessively the conduct of the economy. The withdrawal varies in difficulty 
depending on the initial macroeconomic and political circumstances of the Member States. 
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The State in question should establish the NNC as the sole legal tender and pursue an 
immediate redenomination of existing public debts and/or restructuring and/or defaults in 
the most constrained cases (like Greece). All existent assets, liabilities and contracts 
governed by domestic law should also be redenominated except bank deposits. 
 
Admittedly, fiscal policy in the case of the countries seeking a lower exchange rate should 
be conservative during the whole transition period. In these Euro exit strategies I have 
exposed, all countries would still be part of the EU and would still form part of the EU's 
Economic Governance framework. 
 
During the transition period, monetary policy should gradually deviate from that of the 
ECB once direct convertibility of the currency is allowed. The Central Bank should 
mainly concentrate on upholding an adjustable downward or upward peg to the Euro 
and/or the Dollar and operating a refinancing credit line in order to ease financial 
problems caused by redenomination. 
 
There would be a spillover of the effects onto other European countries, and economic 
normalisation should be achieved between 1 and 2 years after the introduction of the NNC 
as new legal tender.  
Politically and in international relations the withdrawal would suppose a shock with 
probably more lasting consequences about the conception of how European integration 
should be and what are the essential inalienable competences of the State. 
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